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Congress has ordered the mandatory detention of an
entire class of non-citizens who have not yet been ordered
deported, without a hearing and without a chance of bail.
Such detention violates the Excessive Bail Clause.  Less
well-known than the Due Process Clause, the Bail Clause
contains substantial protections against the unnecessary
physical restraint of an individual. Though it does not guar-
antee release on bail in every case, the Excessive Bail Clause
protects against arbitrary detention by requiring that individ-
uals being detained for further proceedings, whether in the
criminal or civil context, be released on bail, unless the denial
of bail is reasonable and justified. This interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment is consistent with both its English histo-
ry, which the Court has deemed important, and with the
Court’s own past interpretation of the Clause.  Furthermore,
this interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is in line with
the contemporary standards of the United States, as reflected
in the laws and practices of the states.  
To ensure that each denial of bail is reasonable, indi-
vidualized determinations that detention is warranted and
adequate procedural protections are required before someone
can be locked away. When the Supreme Court has considered
the Excessive Bail Clause in the context of government-man-
dated detention, it has recognized that individualized find-
ings, procedural protections, and the discretionary nature of
the denial of bail are important factors in upholding detention
without bail.  
None of these factors is present when individuals are
detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which provides that
the Attorney General “shall take into custody any alien who”1
may be removable because he has committed certain criminal
offenses.   Persons held in custody pursuant to this section are
entitled to hearings, in order to guarantee that their detention
is justified and reasonable; if the denial of bail is not reason-
able, it is an excessive government action violative of the
Excessive Bail Clause. 
Under § 1226(c), non-citizens are subject to deten-
tion after completing their sentences for any one of a number
of unrelated offenses including being “a drug abuser or
addict,”2 engaging in “terrorist activities,”3 committing “an
aggravated felony at any time after admission,”4 and com-
mitting a “crime of moral turpitude” within five years of
admission for which the non-citizen was sentenced to at least
one year.5 Those offenses defined as being an “aggravated
felony”6 alone includes such disparate acts as murder and
rape,7 petty theft,8 gambling offenses,9 document fraud,10
perjury,11 and conspiracy to commit any aggravated felony.12
The only basis for § 1226(c) detention is commission, and
completion of a sentence for, one of this wide variety of
offenses, some of which involve violence, but many of which
do not. The simple fact of conviction for an offense in the
designated category does not prove that any person is either
dangerous or at risk of not showing up for later proceedings.
Thus, persons held in custody pursuant to this section are
entitled to hearings, in order to guarantee that their detention
is justified and reasonable.
Detention before a final judgment in the absence of
evidence that a specific individual is either at risk of not
appearing for later proceedings or is a danger to herself or
others, is arbitrary and unconstitutional.  Courts have repeat-
edly held that an individual cannot be locked up, unless it is
punishment imposed after a criminal conviction,13 without
evidence personal to that person proving that detention is
warranted.14 Although most decisions so holding have relied
on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment, the Eighth Amendment also includes a limita-
tion on detention in its mandate that “excessive bail shall not
be required.”15 Because due process has been interpreted so
expansively, the more precise limitation of the Eighth
Amendment has not been necessary in order for the liberty
rights of individuals to be adequately protected. Yet the
Eighth Amendment still matters, particularly when due
process requires less than what would be required under the
Eighth Amendment.  
Section I explains the relationship between due
process and the Excessive Bail Clause.  Sections II through
IV argue that the meaning of the Bail Clause is an open ques-
tion and use history and the Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment precedent to fill in the blanks.  Section V asserts
that the Eighth Amendment should apply in civil removal
proceedings which involve detention.  Finally, Section VI
suggests that the evolving standards of decency test, devel-
oped in the context of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, might find some application in the interpretation of
the Bail Clause.
Before they can be deported,16 aliens are entitled to
a hearing at which they can challenge the grounds for their
deportation or appeal for discretionary relief.17 For nearly a
century, since Yamataya v. Fisher,  the Supreme Court has
recognized that aliens possess Constitutional rights in these
proceedings, though they do not receive the full protections 
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found in a criminal trial.19 The Due Process Clause controls
deportation hearings because they have always been consid-
ered civil proceedings rather than criminal punishment.20 The
Due Process Clause has been interpreted to contain fairly sig-
nificant protections for non-citizens who have been admitted
to the United States,21 if not necessarily for those who seek
admission at the border.22 The due process distinction
between an alien who has been legally admitted and one who
has not is well established.23 The Court has explained that
once an alien has gained admission and develops ties to the
United States, his Constitutional status also changes. Thus,
more process is due to an alien who has been properly admit-
ted in a deportation proceeding than an alien seeking admis-
sion for the first time.24 If Congress wishes to go beyond
deportation and punish an alien for an offense, it can only do
so after a judicial trial subject to the requirements of the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments.25
In civil proceedings, the Due Process Clause has
long been interpreted to prohibit unjustified civil detention.
As a “‘general rule’ . . . the government may not detain a per-
son prior to a judgment of guilt in a criminal trial.”26 Only
in special, limited situations, may the government detain an
individual except as punishment inflicted after a criminal
conviction.27 Specifically, detention predicated on future
behavior has been held unconstitutional unless there is a
“special justification,” outweighing the individual’s interest
in physical freedom, such a mental illness, which renders that
person particularly dangerous.28 For example, the Supreme
Court has held that the government cannot detain a predatory
sex criminal in civil detention by simply establishing that the
individual is dangerous.  In addition to “proof of dangerous-
ness,” the evidence must also establish “proof of some addi-
tional factor, such as ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormali-
ty’” before civil confinement, accompanied by adequate pro-
cedures, is permissible.29 Even in immigration proceedings,
the Court has noted that civil detention without a special jus-
tification and without procedural protections would raise seri-
ous Constitutional problems.30 This interpretation of due
process as requiring both specific findings and sufficient pro-
cedures, familiar and long applicable in civil proceedings
which result in detention, has usually rendered null the need
for any possible additional protections that might be afforded
by the Excessive Bail Clause.    
For example, in Zadvydas v. Davis the Supreme
Court applied a long line of due process precedent in the
immigration context to find that indefinite detention of crim-
inal aliens awaiting deportation was not authorized.31 The
non-citizen in Zadvyas had already been issued a final order
of removal after a full hearing but the United States was
unable to find another country to accept him. This inability to
actually deport the petitioner threatened to make his detention
indefinite. The Court, applying general due process stan-
dards, noted that physical detention even in this context
would require a “special justification” and “adequate proce-
dural protections.”32 Finding serious doubt about the statute’s
constitutionality, the Court read it as authorizing detention
after an order of removal only as long as actual removal was
“reasonably foreseeable.”33 In Zadvyas, the petitioner was
not being held for further proceedings. Instead, he had been
issued a final order of removal and had exhausted his appeals.
Had he been detained for further proceedings, however, the
Bail Clause might have applied but would have been unnec-
essary, as due process supplied adequate constitutional pro-
tections.
In a turnaround, the Court held two years later in
Demore v. Kim that due process did not require any finding of
dangerousness or other justification for § 1226(c) detention
of a legal permanent resident prior to his removal hearing,
even though he had not yet been issued a final removal
order.34 A striking departure from the longstanding require-
ment that individualized evidence must justify detention,
Demore allows individual non-citizens who have committed
certain crimes to be detained under § 1226(c) while awaiting
further proceedings, without a hearing, and regardless of
whether they are a risk of flight or danger to the community.
These potential due process defects of Demore are document-
ed elsewhere.35 But undoubtedly the Court in Demore con-
strued the Due Process Clause as requiring much less in the
immigration context than it had previously held to be
required in other contexts.  Justice Souter in dissent pointed
out that the majority ignored the clear rule that “[d]ue process
calls for an individual determination before someone is
locked away.”36 The only procedure given aliens before they
are detained, Justice Souter noted, are “mechanisms for test-
ing group membership.”37 After Demore, membership in the
group subject to § 1226(c) is a sufficient basis for detention
under due process standards.  No other findings are necessary
and no hearing is required.  
This Note contends that the government actions in
Demore which the Court found to satisfy due process would
not have passed muster under the Excessive Bail Clause.
However, the Demore Court did not have to confront the
issue because the petitioner did not raise an Eighth
Amendment argument.  In reaching its decision, the Demore
majority relied heavily on Carlson v. Landon38 and United
States v. Salerno.39 The majority’s analysis of both precedents
left much to be desired, which is discussed in depth below.40
However, the Eighth Amendment was briefly discussed in the
both of the older cases after lengthy due process analyses.  In
both Carlson and Salerno, the Court treated the Due Process
Clause as requiring both individualized findings and proce-
dural protections, but found both requirements satisfied in
each case. Therefore, the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment, as argued below, were also satisfied and its pro-
tections were superfluous.    
Though not coextensive, the Due Process Clause and
the Excessive Bail Clause can be construed to contain over-
lapping protections in certain situations. The Bail Clause is
much more specific in its application.  Bail, by definition, is
payment made to guarantee a future appearance at future pro-
ceedings.41 Thus, the Bail Clause is implicated only when the
government holds an individual in custody awaiting further
proceedings. To illustrate, it would have found application in
Demore, where the petitioner was being held in order to
appear at his deportation hearing, but probably not in
38
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Zadvydas, where the petitioner’s final removal order had been
issued and his appeals exhausted.  But due process has also
been applied to situations which involve civil detention where
individuals are held to await further proceedings. Because the
Due Process Clause has been interpreted to require the safe-
guards that the Eighth Amendment would require in such situa-
tions, application of the more specific Eighth Amendment has
not been necessary.  However, when the more familiar Due
Process Clause offers less protection than the Bail Clause
would provide, application of the Eighth Amendment becomes
essential. Though it may be employed more rarely, the Bail
Clause is neither less stringent nor less important than the Due
Process Clause.    
The Supreme Court has never definitively answered
the questions of what the Bail Clause means or when it applies.
There are two main obstacles for the argument that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits mandatory detention without bail hear-
ings in immigration cases.  First, the Bail Clause limits only the
amount of bail, when it is proper to set bail, and says nothing
about whether bail shall ever be available at all. Second, it is
often assumed that the Bail Clause applies only to criminal
cases. This section and the next two will show that not only is
the question of whether the Eighth Amendment speaks to the
question of when bail shall be available an open one, but also
that Supreme Court precedent and the English history of bail
can be used to fill in the blanks that the Court has seemingly left
open.  Part V will address the question of the application of the
Bail Clause to civil cases.  
An analysis of the two Supreme Court cases that are
cited most often to make the point that the Eighth Amendment
does not apply to the question of the availability of bail,
Carlson v. Landon42 and United States v. Salerno,43 reveals
that the Court’s supposed answers to this question have in fact
only been obfuscations.  In both Carlson and Salerno, where
the Court had seemed to suggest that the Bail Clause has no
application to the question of whether bail should be available,
the statements were not dispositive.  First, as delineated below,
in both cases, the statements were either vague or dicta, or both.
Second, in each case, the petitioners were seeking actual release
on bail as a matter of right under the Eighth Amendment.
Hearings had already occurred and reasons for the denial of bail
had been given. Thus, any holding that the Bail Clause required
nothing further in those instances would not have covered the
question at issue now. And finally in both cases, a requirement
that bail be reasonable would have already been satisfied,
because the Court found that the Due Process Clause required
it.44 Thus, no Eighth Amendment holding on the issue was nec-
essary.   
The defining, if confusing, passage of the Court’s
interpretation of the Bail Clause can be found in Carlson v.
Landon, when the Court reasons: 
The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the
English Bill of Rights Act. In England that clause has
never been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases,
but merely to provide that bail shall not be excessive 
in those cases where it is proper to grant bail. When 
this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights, 
nothing was said that indicated any different concept.
The Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress 
` from defining the classes of cases in which bail shall 
be allowed in this country. Thus in criminal cases bail
is not compulsory where the punishment may be death.
Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to 
say all arrests must be bailable. We think, clearly, here
that the Eighth Amendment does not require that bail 
be allowed under the circumstances of these cases.45
Although this passage has often been cited as the
Court’s definitive statement that there is no right to bail and that
the Bail Clause applies to no more than the decision about the
amount of bail, upon closer examination it is unclear what the
Court thought it was saying here. The Court argues that “[i]n
England that [excessive bail] clause has never been thought to
accord a right to bail in all cases,” but cites a section of a bail
treatise dealing with the historically unlimited bailing power of
the Court of King’s Bench.46 It is possible that the Court
thought that all English judges had complete discretion to grant
bail or not, but this was not true at the time.47 Even if true, that
fact would support the idea that there was no absolute right to
bail but it would not support the kind of mandatory detention
without a bail hearing at issue currently. The opposite is true; if
the question of bail was entirely discretionary, every individual
at least received a bail hearing in front of a judicial officer and
bail was granted or denied according to the specifics of each
case. The precise question of whether such a hearing is required
did not arise in Carlson because the detained aliens had already
received full hearings. The Court finishes this sentence by not-
ing that the prohibition on excessive bail in England was only
meant to “provide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases
where it is proper to grant bail,” but “proper” is sufficiently
ambiguous to beg the question.
Furthermore, in this Carlson passage, the Court does
not explicitly suggest that its historical reading of the Bail
Clause means that Congress can prohibit the bailing of entire
classes of offenders, even alien Communists, noting that “[t]he
Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress from defining
the classes of cases in which bail shall be allowed in this coun-
try,” and that “bail is not compulsory” in capital cases.48
Thus, bail may not be mandatory and might be left to the dis-
cretion of the justice system, but still is not necessarily prohib-
ited. The difference between “not compulsory” and being pro-
hibited is not just semantic.  If Congress provides that bail is
compulsory in certain cases, it takes the option of denying bail
away from the judiciary, preventing any judge from keeping an
individual in custody because of the particular circumstances.
In this situation, the legislature tips the scale towards individual
liberty, not towards the state; the state can make no showing
that would require an individual to be longer detained.  On the
other hand, when Congress prohibits bail in an entire class of
cases, it takes the option of granting bail away from the judici-
ary, preventing any judge from releasing an individual accord-
ing to her particular circumstances, creating an irrefutable pre-
sumption that detention is warranted and irrevocably tipping the
balance away from individual liberty. A judge in this situation is
barred from taking account of the particular circumstances of
the case or of the characteristics of the individual. An individ-
ual can offer no proof that would allow a judge to release him.
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but a particular denial of bail to specific individuals after full
hearings. Thus, the distinction was not drawn.  
Finally, the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment is anything but clear when it concludes “clearly,
here that the Eighth Amendment does not require that bail be
allowed under the circumstances of these cases.”49
Unfortunately “[i]f what is said is clear, then clearly is not
needed, and if it is not clear, then clearly will not make it so,”50
and it is far from clear whether “the circumstances of these
cases” means circumstances involving Communists, circum-
stances involving non-citizens, circumstances involving civil
proceedings, or all three.  
The language of this passage from Carlson renders it
doubtful whether the Court even intended to lay out a binding
interpretation of the Bail Clause. The Court was instead quite
narrowly focused on the situation at hand and in the end mere-
ly held that the Bail Clause does not guarantee release on bail
in every case.  Furthermore, even if the Court intended to
expound the meaning of the Bail Clause for all time, the vague-
ness and outright errors contained in this passage make it
extremely difficult to decide what was meant. 
Finally, in Salerno, the Court did say in dicta that the
Eighth Amendment “of course, says nothing about whether bail
shall be available at all.”51 However, in that case the Court later
made clear that it was not holding that there is no right to bail
at all in the Eighth Amendment.  First, the Court went on to
quote in full the confusing paragraph from Carlson.52As noted
above, it is difficult to rely on this paragraph to explain the
meaning of the Bail Clause. The Court then clearly stated that
“we need not decide today whether the Excessive Bail Clause
speaks at all to Congress’ power to define the classes of crimi-
nal arrestees who shall be admitted to bail.”53 So in Salerno,
despite the dicta, the Court did not in fact answer the question
of whether the Eighth Amendment speaks at all to whether bail
shall ever be available.  Regardless of whether that is true or
not, the Court said, the Bail Reform Act at issue passed muster
under the Eighth Amendment.54
Thus, neither Carlson nor Salerno precludes the find-
ing of a right to bail. The Court has relied heavily on history in
finding no absolute right to release on bail, but in dicta and
vague passages that should not be taken out of context to per-
manently restrict the meaning of the Bail Clause. In fact, the
Court has never definitively held that the Eighth Amendment
applies only to the amount of bail or that there is no form of a
right to bail under the Eighth Amendment.  
The Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment
provides only that “excessive bail shall not be required.”55
These words mirror those of clause 10 of the English Bill of
Rights of 1689, on which the Bail Clause was purposely mod-
eled.56 The English version provided that “excessive bail ought
not to be required.”57 The American Founders changed only
the aspirational “ought not” of the English version to the pro-
hibitory “shall not” when they imported the clause into the
Eighth Amendment.  In England at the time the American Bill
of Rights was written, bail was largely regulated by statutes
which specified whether bail was available or not for a host of
offenses.  But even if bail was not allowed by statute, the high-
est level of the English judiciary, the Court of King’s Bench,
could always grant bail according to the circumstances of each
case. Therefore, bail could never be completely foreclosed by
statute, as the King’s Bench could always examine each indi-
vidual case to ensure that the denial of bail was reasonable and
warranted.  
The English history of the Bail Clause is relevant, first
because history always plays an important role in the interpre-
tation of the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court has
explained that the “basic mode of inquiry” in considering the
applicability of the various clauses of the Eighth Amendment
is to “look to the origins of the Clause and the purposes which
directed its framers.”58 The history of the Bail Clause is doubly
important because it has often been wrongly interpreted.  In the
past, the Court has relied heavily upon English history in defin-
ing the scope of the Bail Clause and finding that it does not
guarantee a right to release on bail in all cases.59 Yet this same
history has been suggested to extend beyond its actual histori-
cal meaning to support the additional proposition that the Bail
Clause only prevents a judge from setting bail at an unreason-
ably high amount when she has already decided to grant bail,
but says nothing about whether bail must ever be available at
all.60 There is an important difference, however, between argu-
ing that the Bail Clause guarantees a right to release on bail in
every case (an argument which the Court has rejected more
than once) and arguing that the Bail Clause requires that the
denial of bail be reasonable (an argument which the Court has
not addressed).  If the former were true, then bail must always
be set, regardless of the situation.  If the latter is true, on the
other hand, bail must simply be available; it can be denied, but
it must be denied according to the circumstances of the partic-
ular case. 
In actuality, a scheme of mandatory detention, like
that created by § 1226(c), with no chance of bail was unheard
of at common law. The assertion in Carlson that clause 10 of
the English Bill of Rights, on which the Excessive Bail Clause
is based, did not grant an absolute right to bail is true, because
in England, the prohibition on excessive bail was only one part
of the protections against pre-trial detention.  Protection
against unwarranted pretrial detention had three essential ele-
ments; 1) a determination of whether the detained had a right
to bail, answered by various statues detailing who justices of
the peace could and could not bail and by the Petition of Right;
2) habeas corpus procedures developed to guarantee these
statutory rights, which might otherwise be thwarted; and, 3) a
prohibition on excessive bail as protection against judicial
abuse.61 The excessive bail clause of the English Bill of Rights
Act of 1689, the English precursor of the Eighth Amendment,
does not accord a right to bail because it was the last piece in
the long progression towards the prevention of pretrial deten-
tion. Thus, the right to bail was already well-defined else-
where.  
The first Statute of Westminster, passed in 1275,62
formed the bedrock of English bail law for “five centuries and
a half.”63 This statute provided a detailed list of the offenses
that sheriffs must bail and those that they could not.64 Many
additional statutes supplemented the list over the next several
centuries, adding to the technical tangle, and the justices of the
peace took over the bailing power of the sheriffs and were like-
wise restrained by the bail statutes.65 Notably, these statutes
never bound the Court of King’s Bench.66 In sum, “bail law
The English History of Bail
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specified bailable and nonbailable offenses for lesser officers,
but gave them considerable discretion in cases that were
‘dubious.’  It also gave great power to the Court of King’s
Bench, or to any judge of that court in time of vacation, to
rule on bail.”67
However, as the law progressed, important English
safeguards against pretrial detention grew out of cases that
illuminated abuses in this system.  In Darnel’s Case, five
knights were imprisoned by the special command of the king
after having refused to give the king a loan.68 One of the
knights brought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that by law
he was bailable and that there was no cause for the imprison-
ment. The Court of King’s Bench upheld the king’s power to
imprison without showing cause, and then held that without a
cause shown, they lacked the power to judge whether or not
bail should be granted.  Instead, the court suggested that the
prisoner appeal to the mercy of the king, who did know the
cause for the imprisonment.69 The House of Commons
responded immediately, emphasizing that the decision in
Darnel’s Case undermined all of the law governing pretrial
detention and bail.70 The Petition first complained, inter alia,
that despite the guarantees of Magna Carta, subjects had been
imprisoned without cause and had illegally been denied bail;
it then outlawed detention without cause, requiring that “no
freeman in any such manner as is before mentioned, be
imprisoned or detained.”71
Despite the Petition of Right, due to the haziness of
the habeas corpus procedures at the time, it was not always
clear which courts could issue the different habeas corpus
writs, and it was fairly easy for jailers to delay or avoid bail-
ing a prisoner before trial.72 These problems are well illus-
trated by Jenkes’ Case, in which a man was imprisoned for
making a speech calling for a new Parliament.73 By statute,
he was clearly entitled to be bailed, but months after his arrest
he still could not get a court to set bail, and was ultimately
released only through an informal bureaucratic procedure. 74
In response to countless cases like Jenkes’, Parliament enact-
ed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which protested that
“many of the King’s subjects have been and hereafter may be
long detained in prison, in such cases where by law they are
bailable…”75 To prevent such abuse, the Act then set out
detailed procedures for habeas corpus, closing the loopholes
and providing penalties for all judges who did not comply.76
Further problems again arose. As the Act “mainly
conferred a power to discharge on bail”, it “could easily be
obstructed merely by imposing excessive bail which the pris-
oner was unable to raise.”77 Such a practice did indeed devel-
op, and in 1689, one of the abuses alleged in the English Bill
of Rights was that excessive bail had been required, “to elude
the benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the subjects.”78
Parliament’s answer was clause 10 of the Bill of Rights,
which provided that “excessive bail ought not to be
required.”79 This clause later formed the basis of the Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.80
Each piece of the English laws protecting individu-
als against pretrial detention, culminating in the excessive
bail clause of the English Bill of Rights, was dependent on
the others.81 Even those who dispute the fact that the Bail
Clause of the Eighth Amendment protects any residual right
to bail acknowledge its complicated history, and  that “there
was a direct connection between the Petition of Right of 1628
which prohibited arrests without notification of the cause,
with the Habeas Corpus Act of 1670 which was to ensure
speedy judicial review of the causes of arrests, and the exces-
sive bail clause of the Bill of Rights of 1689 which was to
prevent obstruction of the Habeas Corpus Act.”82 All three
points of the English system were imported into the
Constitution: the right to be informed of the cause of the
accusations in the Sixth Amendment,83 habeas corpus in Art.
I, § 9,84 and the prohibition of excessive bail in the Eighth
Amendment.85 However, the underlying right to bail, which
had initially been defined by the Statute of Westminster, was
not explicitly incorporated, leaving open the question of how
to answer the question of what offenses should be bailable.  
The Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that the
fact that a right to bail was not explicitly included in the
Constitution means that the Eighth Amendment says nothing
about whether bail should ever be available.86 To enshrine
this interpretation would ignore not only the long struggle
against unjustified detention underlying the Amendment, but
also the courts’ historical role in the granting or denial of bail.
To interpret the Bail Clause untethered from its origins com-
pletely ignores the centuries of development that led to its
inclusion in the Bill of Rights in 1689 and then into the
American Constitution.  Interpreted so narrowly, the Eighth
Amendment never restrains Congress when it decides
whether bail should be available.  In Carlson, the Court cites
Blackstone stating that, “[i]n England, there was a series of
crimes and situations where the arrested person ‘could have
no other sureties but the four walls of the prison.’”87
This, the Court says in dicta, means that the Excessive Bail
Clause guarantees nothing, but merely prohibits excessive
bail where bail is otherwise set.  However, Blackstone in the
same passage goes on to take account of the full history of
bail, explaining that the certain offenses and persons to which
he was referring could not be admitted to bail by the justices
of the peace, but “it is agreed that the court of king’s
bench…may bail for any crime whatsoever, be it treason,
murder, or any other offense, according to the circumstances
of the case.”88 
King’s Bench cases from the 17th and 18th centuries
also explicitly recognize the power of that Court to bail in
any case. A sample of these cases shows that this power was
generally accepted and clearly established.  In Rex v. Rudd, a
felony forgery case, the court denied bail but noted that “this
Court has undoubtedly a discretionary power to bail in all
cases whatsoever.”89 Likewise, in Rex v. Marks, another
felony case, the court noted that “[t]here is not doubt of the
power of this Court to bail, if they see occasion, in all cases
of felony, even in case of murder, though there should be no
doubt as to the validity of the warrant of commitment.”90 In
yet another case, the court demonstrated this power by grant-
ing bail in the case of an alleged rape, because it91 found that
the defendant was not a flight risk. And in Witham and
Dutton, the court refused bail but noted explicitly that it “may
likewise bail for murder” although recognizing that it is “sel-
dom done.”92
Furthermore, renowned 19th century English legal
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scholars, including Hale, Coke and Blackstone, agree that
King’s Bench had unlimited bailing power.93 The reason for
this exception, Blackstone noted, is because “there are cases,
though they rarely happen, in which it would be hard and
unjust to confine a man in prison, though accused even of the
greatest offense. The law has therefore provided one court,
and only one, which has discretionary power of bailing in any
case.”94 Thus, though not every defendant was bailable by the
lower courts, and the legislature could prohibit the justices of
the peace from granting bail to certain classes of offenders,
no individual was categorically denied bail at common law.
In England, at the time the American Bill of Rights was
enacted, the highest level of the judiciary could always grant
bail, even if the denial was required by statute. 
How the unlimited bailing power of the Court of
King’s Bench should affect the interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment is obviously difficult to discern. At the very
least, the history of the Eighth Amendment has been misun-
derstood, while at the same time, the Court has relied heavi-
ly upon history in interpreting the Bail Clause. This history
has been cited for the simple proposition that the Eighth
Amendment guarantees no right to bail, but also for the addi-
tional proposition that if there is no absolute guarantee to
release on bail, then the Amendment places no limits on the
decision whether or not to grant bail. The historical interac-
tion between the right to bail, habeas corpus and the prohibi-
tion on excessive bail demonstrates that the question of what
the Bail Clause guarantees is not so straightforward.  In actu-
ality, a full analysis of the history confirms that bail was
indeed not compulsory, but also confirms that it was never
completely barred. The courts could always review the deten-
tion and grant bail if such detention was not warranted.  By
contrast, § 1226(c) requires no reason for the denial of bail
and allows no court, indeed even does not allow any execu-
tive official, to review the detention. The words “excessive
bail shall not be required” include a much stronger guarantee
when it is assured that a court will review any denial of bail
for reasonableness.  By parroting the words of the English
Bill of Rights, the Framers seemed to intend to incorporate
everything which that right guaranteed, and the Court has
indicated that this history is the touchstone for the interpreta-
tion of the Bail Clause.  But in England at that time, the pro-
hibition on excessive bail meant very little without its con-
nected guarantees, including the unlimited power of one sec-
tor of the judiciary.
If the Clause has any meaning at all, it must imply
some constitutional protection of a right to bail.95 Otherwise,
it does not limit Congress in deciding whether bail is ever
available, nor does it restrain a judge who is deciding whether
bail should be set in any particular case. A return to the
Supreme Court precedent dealing with the Eighth
Amendment generally, and with the Bail Clause specifically,
leads to the conclusion that the Excessive Bail Clause should
be interpreted to prohibit the unreasoned denial of bail.  Such
an interpretation strikes a balance between finding an
absolute right to bail in the Eighth Amendment, which the
Court has rejected, and finding no guarantee at all in the
Eighth Amendment, which would render it essentially mean-
ingless. 
If the Clause has any meaning at all, it must imply
some constitutional protection of a right to bail.   Otherwise,
it does not limit Congress in deciding whether bail is ever
available, nor does it restrain a judge who is deciding whether
bail should be set in any particular case. A return to the
Supreme Court precedent dealing with the Eighth
Amendment generally, and with the Bail Clause specifically,
leads to the conclusion that the Excessive Bail Clause should
be interpreted to prohibit the unreasoned denial of bail.  Such
an interpretation strikes a balance between finding an
absolute right to bail in the Eighth Amendment, which the
Court has rejected, and finding no guarantee at all in the
Eighth Amendment, which would render it essentially mean-
ingless. 
In the main decisions upholding no-bail detention as
a reasonable government action, United States v. Salerno96
and Carlson v. Landon,97 the Supreme Court has recognized
three factors as important: an individualized finding of dan-
gerousness or risk of flight, procedural protections and the
discretion of government officials.  In the case of detention
pursuant to § 1226(c), none of these factors is present and
there are no safeguards against unwarranted detention. Thus,
non-citizens are entitled to an individualized determination of
dangerousness or risk of flight to ensure that the denial of bail
to them is not unreasonable in violation of the Excessive Bail
Clause.  Such an interpretation would require only that there
be a non-arbitrary justification for detention without bail, and
would require basic procedures, such as a hearing, to ensure
that a valid justification exists.  
Though the Court has never directly confronted the
issue, several individual justices have expressed the view that
the Eighth Amendment means that the denial of bail cannot
be arbitrary.  For example, in Sellers v. United States, Justice
Black explained that “[t]he command of the Eighth
Amendment that excessive bail shall not be required at the
very least obligates judges passing upon the right to bail to
deny such relief only for the strongest of reasons.”98
Likewise, in Carlisle v. Landon, a case involving one of the
petitioners from Carlson v. Landon, Justice Douglas agreed
that the Bail Clause means that “a person may not be capri-
ciously held…[i]t is the unreasoned denial of bail that the
Constitution condemns…[u]nder our constitutional system
the power to hold without bail is subject to judicial review.
There must be an informed reason for the detention.”99
Carlisle was released on bail because in the intervening time
between Carlson and Carlisle, he had proven that he was not
dangerous and thus that there was no longer any justification
for his detention.100 Justice Frankfurter, also dissenting in
Carlson, argued that “To deny bail, the Attorney General
should have a reasonable basis for believing that the circum-
stances attending [a petitioner] present too hazardous a risk in
leaving him at large.”101 Justice Burton agreed, writing that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail as well as the
“unreasonable denial of bail.”102 The Carlson majority found
in their due process analysis that there were sufficient
grounds to establish that the alien Communists posed a dan-
ger to the nation and thus the Eighth Amendment would like-
wise have been satisfied.103 The disagreement in Carlson was
not whether the Eighth Amendment required a showing of
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dangerousness before bail could be denied, and the majority did
not answer that question. The question was whether the govern-
ment had in fact made a sufficient showing that the petitioners
were dangerous.104
Although the Court has recognized that the Eighth
Amendment does not guarantee an absolute right to release on
bail in all cases,105 it has explained that the Amendment “places
limits on the steps a government may take against an individual,
whether it be keeping him in prison, imposing excessive mone-
tary sanctions, or using cruel and unusual punishments.”106
These exact substantive limits have never been exhaustively
outlined, but the Supreme Court gave some guidance in Salerno
in upholding the Bail Reform Act.  
In Salerno, the Court first noted that the government
could detain individuals without bail only if it had a compelling
interest in doing so.107 “The primary function of bail” is “to
safeguard the courts’ role in adjudicating the guilt or innocence
of defendants.” The government can pursue other compelling
interests through regulation of bail and release.108 The Court
then noted that, even if the government has a sufficiently com-
pelling interest in detention, the “substantive limitation of the
Bail Clause” requires that “the government’s proposed condi-
tions of release or detention must not be ‘excessive’ in light of
the perceived evil.”109 In short, “To determine whether the
Government’s response is excessive” under the Eighth
Amendment, a court “must compare that response against the
interest the Government seeks to protect by means of that
response.”110 For example, “when the government has admitted
that its only interest is in preventing flight, bail must be set by
a court at a sum designed to ensure that goal, and no more.”111
The Salerno Court held that the government must
articulate a reason for the denial of bail and must also prove that
detention without bail is the appropriate response to further that
interest.  Courts have generally accepted just two compelling
justifications for the denial of bail: ensuring presence at trial,112
and risk of future dangerousness.113 Not surprisingly, these two
reasons have also been the justifications offered by the govern-
ment for detention under § 1226(c).114 In addition to serving a
valid interest, the Supreme Court  in Salerno and Carlson found
several other factors to be important when upholding no-bail
detention as a reasonable response to those two interests,
including individualized determinatons of flight risk or danger-
ousness, procedural protections and the discretionary nature of
the denial of bail.  None of these factors are present in deten-
tions under § 1226.  
The Bail Reform Act, which was upheld in Salerno,
allowed defendants to be detained before trial if the government
could show by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions
of release would “reasonably assure ... the safety of any other
person and the community.”115 Detention had to be the last
resort. The detainees in Salerno were two individuals who had
been charged with 29 violations of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), including fraud, extor-
tion, criminal gambling and conspiracy to commit murder and
who the government intended to prove were in charge of a noto-
rious crime family.116 Salerno involved only a facial challenge
to the statute. The Court required the challengers to prove that
the Act would be invalid under any set of circumstances.117 The
preventive detention provision was found not to be an excessive
response to the defendants’ perceived dangerousness because it
applied only to individuals indicted on specified “serious”
felonies.  Moreover, it provided substantial procedural protec-
tions, the foremost of which was an individualized hearing
before a judicial officer which included a right to counsel and
cross-examination.118 Under these circumstances, the Court
refused to hold the Act facially unconstitutional, charactering
its holding thus:  detention without bail is constitutional for
“arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after an
adversary hearing to pose a threat to the safety of individuals or
to the community which no condition of release can dispel. The
numerous procedural safeguards detailed above must attend this
adversary hearing.”119 Thus, for detention without bail to be
constitutional under Salerno, at the very least, an individual has
to be specifically found to be dangerous after a hearing before
a judicial officer. That is not the case under § 1226, nor is this
provision limited to the commission of very serious felonies.
Instead, it covers a wide range of offenses of varying degrees of
severity.  Finally, a § 1226(c) detention is not a last resort to be
used only when necessary; rather it is the initial, and only gov-
ernment response.  
In the McCarthy-era decision, Carlson v. Landon, the
Supreme Court responded to an Eighth Amendment challenge
by upholding the detention of certain non-citizens who were
members of the Communist Party.120 The facts of Carlson are
similar to detentions under § 1226(c), apart from the crucial fact
that Carlson did not involve mandatory detention of all
Communist Party members without individualized determina-
tions.  Even the government stated, in response to the con-
tention that the statute made it “mandatory on the Attorney
General to deny bail to alien communists,” that “[w]e need not
consider the constitutionality of such a law for that is not what
the present law provides.”121 In addition to the discretionary
nature of the detention without bail, two very important factors
contributed to the validity of the detention in Carlson that are
not present in detentions under § 1226(c): individualized deter-
minations and a denial of bail only to a limited group.   
The most important distinguishing factor between cur-
rent detentions under § 1226 and Carlson is that individualized
determinations of dangerousness were made in Carlson.
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist contends in Demore that
“[t]he aliens in Carlson had not been found individually danger-
ous,” he only cites Justice Black’s Carlson dissent.122 The
Carlson majority, on the other hand, reasoned that “evidence of
membership in the [Communist Party] plus personal activity in
supporting and extending the Party’s philosophy concerning
violence” were sufficient grounds to establish dangerous-
ness.123 Thus, Carlson merely held that the immigration deten-
tion of those persons specially determined to pose a “menace to
the public interest” did not violate the Bail Clause.124 “Of
course,” the Court noted, “purpose to injure could not be imput-
ed generally to all aliens subject to deportation,” suggesting that
had they agreed with Justices Black and Rehnquist that if indi-
vidual dangerousness had not been established, they would
have been concerned.125 The situation under § 1226(c) is entire-
ly the opposite; all aliens who are deportable because of certain
crimes—which may or may not be crimes of violence—are
detained without bond and without a determination of danger-
ousness or risk of flight.
In Demore, Chief Justice Rehnquist did attempt to
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analogize mandatory detentions under § 1226(c) to the deten-
tion of Communists in Carlson, suggesting that the conduct
which served as the basis for a criminal conviction is “per-
sonal activity” in the same way that the Carlson petitioners
had engaged in “personal activity” supporting the Communist
cause.126
There is, of course, a crucial distinction. The commit-
ment of criminal acts of varying degrees of severity by unrelat-
ed non-citizens is not the same “personal activity” as is coordi-
nated steps taken by individuals who have a group goal of vio-
lent overthrow of the government.Thus, the finding of “person-
al activity” in Carlson indicated the individual’s support for a
goal which had been repeatedly found to threaten the security
of the United States. The “personal activity” in §1226(c) deten-
tion does not establish such a finding of dangerousness.  It
merely establishes that the individual had committed one of a
host of criminal acts, some serious and some less so, which
makes him or her part of a group connected only by the fact of
falling under § 1226(c).
Even if the “personal activity” finding in Carlson is
considered a typical “individualized determination,” the Court
has recognized that Carlson is a somewhat unique case
because it implicated communism and national security.
Carlson does not hold that the detention of any entire group of
unrelated non-citizens without bail is constitutionally legiti-
mate.127 In Carlson, alien Communists were denied bail
“because of Congress’ understanding of their attitude toward
the use of force and violence in such a constitutional democra-
cy as ours to accomplish their political aims.”128 Detention
without bail was not excessive because of the perceived mag-
nitude of the threat being responded to. Alien Communists
were specifically designated by Congress as national security
threats.129 In Carlson itself, members of the Communist Party
were characterized as “members of organizations devoted to
the overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the
United States,”130 with the Court adding:
We have no doubt that the doctrines and practices 
of Communism clearly enough teach the use of force
to achieve political control to give constitutional 
basis, according to any theory of reasonableness or 
arbitrariness, for Congress to expel known alien 
communists under its power to regulate the exclus
ion, admission and expulsion of aliens.131
The Attorney General defended the detention of the petitioners
on the same grounds, arguing “that there was reasonable cause
to believe that petitioners’ release would be prejudicial to the
public interest and would endanger the welfare and safety of
the United States.”132
The Court has continually recognized that in the
1950’s communism presented special legal problems which are
not applicable outside of that context.  In one case, the
Supreme Court noted that it has “consistently refused to view
the Communist Party as an ordinary political party, and has
upheld federal legislation aimed at the Communist problem
which, in a different context, would certainly have raised con-
stitutional issues of the gravest character,” citing specifically
Carlson v. Landon.133 In yet another later case, the Court again
characterized Carlson as a case involving detention of aliens
“on the ground that they posed a threat to national security.”134
The policy that justified the detention in Carlson, the Court
explained, was “the congressional determination that the pres-
ence of alien Communists constituted an unacceptable threat to
the Nation.135 The fact that, in an atmosphere of alarm, the
Supreme Court held that the detention of certain aliens desig-
nated as threats to national security did not violate the
Excessive Bail Clause does not answer the question of whether
a large group of unrelated, unconnected, aliens can likewise be
detained without bail hearings.  It has not been, and could not
be suggested that all aliens currently subject to mandatory
detention while awaiting removal proceedings pose any nation-
al security threat to the United States. They are not organized
or acting in concert.  Many are subject to detention because of
relatively ordinary, everyday actions, ranging from being a
drug addict to document fraud.  Non-citizens subject to manda-
tory detention are far from being an organized group acting
towards a common goal which threatens the national security
of the United States, as communism was feared to do at the
time Carlson was decided. 
Furthermore, in direct contrast to the situation under §
1226(c), the Carlson Court found it important that, even with
the findings regarding alien Communists generally, there was
“no evidence or contention that all persons arrested as
deportable . . . for Communist membership are denied bail.”
Despite Chief Justice Rehnquist’s contention in Demore that
“the INS had adopted a policy of refusing to grant bail to those
aliens in light of what Justice Frankfurter viewed as the mistak-
en ‘conception that Congress had made [alien Communists] in
effect unbailable,’”136 the Carlsonmajority explicitly relied on
a government report showing that “the large majority” of aliens
arrested on charges comparable to the Carlson aliens were
allowed bail.137 Indeed, the Court went out of its way to ensure
that detention without bail was not the rule when it requested
that the government submit the report detailing the status of
those individuals held pursuant to the no-bail provision. The
court concluded that “It is quite clear from the list that deten-
tion without bond has been the exception.”138 This suggests
that the Court would have been troubled had detention been
class-wide and mandatory. 
The denial of bail to a limited class of aliens, or to par-
ticular individuals, who were specifically determined to pose a
danger to the public is not at all akin to the current situation,
where a large class of aliens is detained regardless of whether
they are individually dangerous or a flight risk.  Furthermore,
Carlson has never stood for the proposition that it is constitu-
tionally unproblematic to deny bail to all aliens without indi-
vidualized hearings. Where the Supreme Court subsequently
has cited Carlson, it has given it a narrow interpretation.  In
Salerno, the Court cited Carlson for the proposition that there
is “no absolute constitutional barrier to detention of potential-
ly dangerous resident aliens pending deportation proceed-
ings.”139 In I&S v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Court characterized
Carlson as holding that the Eighth Amendment does not
require bail to be granted in “certain” deportation cases.140
Finally, in I&S v. &at’l Center for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., the
Court recognized that the detention scheme in Carlson required
at least “some level of individualized determination” as a pre-
condition to detention.141 Thus, Carlsonmerely establishes that
there is no absolute barrier to the denial of bail to a specified
group of non-citizens, as long as that denial based on an indi-
vidual determination of dangerousness or some other comp-
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elling government interest requiring detention. As the deten-
tion under § 1226(c) is mandatory, with no hearing and no
individualized determination, Carlson is not dispositive. 
Additionally, in both Salerno and Carlson, deten-
tions were reviewable.  In Salerno, the Bail Reform Act pro-
vided for expedited appellate review of the detention.142 In
Carlson, the Court explained that, “In carrying out that poli-
cy [of deportation] the Attorney General is not left with
untrammeled discretion as to bail.  Courts review his deter-
mination.  Hearings are had, and he must justify his refusal
of bail by reference to the legislative scheme to eradicate the
evils of Communist activity.”143 In contrast, in the current
situation, no court can review the denial of bail because
those detained receive no hearing; there is no record to
review.  No official must justify the denial of bail or show
how that denial serves the legislative purposes better than
conditions on release would.
Finally, the balancing of the government’s interest
against its response in detentions under § 1226(c) is different
than that in Carlson or Salerno because currently detained
immigrants would only be asking for a bail hearing, not for
release.  In both Salerno and Carlson, the government action
at issue was the denial of bail after a hearing to determine if
that denial was warranted.  In both cases, the Court relied
fairly heavily on the existence of those procedures to find
that the action was not excessive.  By contrast, government
action in detaining non-citizens under § 1226(c) is much
more severe. The denial of bail is categorical and no hearing
may be held.  Regardless of the circumstances, non-citizens
who fall into the relevant categories are detained without a
possibility of release on bail, regardless of whether they pose
a risk of flight or a danger to the community.   Moreover,
non-citizens would be required to appear at a removal hear-
ing and face consequences. As in Zadvydas v. Davis, where
the Court found the indefinite detention of removable non-
citizens to be constitutionally problematic, “The question
before [the courts] is not one of ‘confer[ring] on those admit-
ted the right to remain against the national will’ who should
be removed.”144 The choice would not “be between impris-
onment and the alien ‘living at large.’ It is between imprison-
ment and supervision under release conditions that may not
be violated.”145 All that is required is a hearing to determine
whether or not detention is necessary. 
In sum, the Court has explained that if the denial of
bail is not a reasonable response to a compelling government
interest, such a denial is an excessive government action
under the Eighth Amendment. The government interests
served by § 1226(c) are ensuring that the non-citizen appears
for later proceedings and protecting the community from
danger. These interests are clearly valid, but the means of
implementing them are just as clearly unreasonable. The lack
of individualized findings of dangerousness or risk of flight,
the absence of procedural protections, and the mandatory
nature of the detention—which allows no opportunity nor
any discretion for either the detaining official or any judge to
release any of those detained regardless of the circum-
stances—renders § 1226(c) an excessive response to those
interests. 
Lastly, making the Excessive Bail Clause, a provi-
sion of the Bill of Rights, dependent upon an outside act of
the legislature—as it would be if it existed at the whim of
Congress—is extraordinary.  If the Bail Clause means only
that bail cannot be excessive when it is set but does not
restrict the legislature’s ability to classify the cases and
offenses that are not bailable, then the Clause does not limit
the steps that Congress can take against any individual.
Congress could simply declare that no offenses are bailable
without violating the Eighth Amendment, thereby keeping
every person accused of any crime in prison before trial.
However, “The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to with-
draw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political con-
troversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts.”146 As Justice Black argued in
Carlson, unless some protection against the arbitrary denial
of bail is found in the Eighth Amendment, the Bail Clause
“does no more than protect a right to bail which Congress
can grant and Congress can take away. The Amendment is
thus reduced below the level of a pious admonition.”147 The
Eighth Amendment, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, was
instituted as a check on government power. To interpret it as
being completely subject to the whim of those that it sought
to limit renders it meaningless.  
The remaining obstacle to the argument that the Bail
Clause requires hearings before non-citizens can be detained
without bail under § 1226(c) is the argument that the Eighth
Amendment does not apply in this civil context.
The Supreme Court has never defined the scope of the
Excessive Bail Clause, but has noted that “bail, by its very
nature, is implicated only when there is a direct government
restraint on personal liberty, be it in a criminal case or a civil
deportation proceeding. The potential for governmental
abuse which the Bail Clause guards against is present in both
instances...”148 The threat of an arbitrary deprivation of phys-
ical liberty is present whenever the government physically
restrains an individual absent a criminal conviction.  Because
of the risk of the unnecessary and unwarranted deprivation of
liberty, which the Eighth Amendment guards against, it
should be interpreted to apply against the government when-
ever it detains an individual for further proceedings, regard-
less of whether the proceeding that results in detention is
labeled “criminal” or “civil.” 
Though the Supreme Court has occasionally sug-
gested that the Eighth Amendment applies only in criminal
cases,149 it has never actually held that the Amendment is
limited in this way.  On the contrary, the Court has carefully
avoided delineating its outer reaches.  In Browning-Ferris, a
case involving the Excessive Fines Clause, the Court held
that the Eighth Amendment did not apply “in a suit between
private parties,” but noted that they were not deciding that
the Eighth Amendment only applies to criminal cases.150
“Whatever the outer confines of the [Excessive Fines]
Clause’s reach may be,” the Court explained, “we now
decide only that it does not constrain an award of money
damages in a civil suit when the government neither has
prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of
the damages awarded.” Although Browning-Ferris deals with
the Excessive Fines Clause, the Court declared that “the
Application of the Excessive Bail Clause 
Spring 200945
of the damages awarded.”151 Although Browning-Ferris deals with
the Excessive Fines Clause, the Court declared that “the insights
into the meaning of the Eighth Amendment” reached in cases deal-
ing with one clause “are highly instructive” in determining the
meaning of the other clauses of the Eighth Amendment.152
Thus, the Court recognized that the appropriate question might not
be whether the Eighth Amendment generally applies in “civil” cases
but whether the Eighth Amendment applies against government
action, in any context.  By contrast, when a non-citizen is detained
pending a removal hearing, the government is prosecuting the
action and doing the detaining. The action is not between two pri-
vate parties, but between the government and an individual entitled
to constitutional protection,153 a classic case for the application of
the Bill of Rights. 
Even when the Supreme Court has recognized that the tra-
ditional application of the Eighth Amendment is in the criminal
context, it has acknowledged that the Amendment may find some
applicability in other situations.  In Ingraham v. Wright, where the
Court suggested that the Eighth Amendment might apply only to
criminal punishments,154 the opinion still left open the possibility
that it might apply in some civil cases that “though not labeled
‘criminal’ by the State, may be sufficiently analogous to criminal
punishments in the circumstances in which they are administered to
justify application of the Eighth Amendment,” citing the examples
of “persons involuntarily confined in mental or juvenile institu-
tions.”155 Thus, the Court has recognized that the fact that proceed-
ings are labeled “civil” does not preclude application of the
Amendment.  
It is illuminating that the examples cited by the Court as
potentially warranting application of the Eighth Amendment, even
though they are not necessarily “criminal,” involve detention, sup-
porting the proposition that the Eighth Amendment should apply in
situations where the government detains an individual awaiting fur-
ther court proceedings.   Government detention is of course one of
the most serious deprivations of an individual’s rights and it makes
sense that it is in this context where the most stringent restrictions
would be necessary.  Criminal pretrial detention is the typical and
most common example of such a situation, but it is not the only con-
text in which the state makes the decision to detain a person.
While labeled “civil,” proceedings that result in deprivation of
physical liberty, like the deportation proceedings at issue, are still
vulnerable to the same abuses as any criminal pretrial detention.
Just as a prosecutor, if unchecked by a judge, could unnecessarily
detain an individual who was not dangerous and was not a flight
risk, an immigration official, unchecked by a judge, can easily be
overly cautious in deciding to detain an immigrant who is not a dan-
ger or a flight risk.  Serious errors are virtually assured in the cur-
rent situation, where not even an immigration official can decide
that custody is not necessary; Congress has made the irreversible
decision that the entire class must be held in custody.  
The text of the Eighth Amendment does not support the
conclusion that it applies only to criminal cases.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[s]ome provisions of the
Bill of Rights are expressly limited to criminal cases,” for example
some sections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,  “[t]he text of the
Eighth Amendment, however,  includes no similar limitation.”156
The Indictment Clause and the Self-Incrimination Clause of the
Fifth Amendment include references to “crime” and “criminal case”
respectively and have been thus limited. The Due Process Clause of
the same Amendment, however, includes no such limitation and has
not been limited in that way. The Sixth Amendment specifically
refers to “all criminal prosecutions” and is correspondingly limited
in its protections. The Eighth Amendment nowhere limits itself to
criminal cases.  Even if one clause is limited to criminal cases, sim-
ilar to the Fifth Amendment, the Bail Clause is not necessarily also
limited in the same way. An example would be the word “punish-
ment” in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause being con-
strued to apply only to punishment after a criminal trial.  
The constitutional convention debate history of the Eighth
Amendment does not indicate that it was to be limited to explicitly
“criminal” cases. The Supreme Court has explained that
“Consideration of the Eighth Amendment immediately followed
consideration of the Fifth Amendment…after deciding to confine
the benefits of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to criminal proceedings, the Framers turned their atten-
tion to the Eighth Amendment. There were no proposals to limit that
Amendment to criminal proceedings…”157 The Eighth Amendment
is hardly even mentioned in the convention debate. Thus, the pri-
mary history of the Bail Clause is its English predecessor, from
which the convention took its language.158 This predecessor, § 10 of
the English Bill of Rights of 1689, also “contains no reference to
‘criminal cases’ and, thus, would seem to apply the principle to all
cases.”159
Application of the Eighth Amendment to civil deportation
proceedings is not novel.  Several federal courts have applied the
limitations of the Excessive Bail Clause in the context of deporta-
tion proceedings.160 Furthermore, in Carlson v. Landon, the
Supreme Court met the argument that the Eighth Amendment
required bail to be set in deportation proceedings as well as in crim-
inal cases.161 The government contended that, “[s]ince these pro-
ceedings are not criminal in character, the Eighth Amendment has
no application.”162 However, the Court did not make a distinction
between civil and criminal proceedings and did not dismiss the
Eighth Amendment as inapplicable in civil cases, but instead found
that bail had been properly denied.163 In a later case, the Court rec-
ognized that “[t]here is language in Carlson v. Landon suggesting
that the Bail Clause may be implicated in civil deportation proceed-
ings.”164 After Carlson was decided, one of the petitioners was
released on bail while his appeals were pending.165 In order to gain
release on bail, he had to show that there was a substantial question
to be resolved on appeal; Justice Douglas, who had the power to
bail the petitioner, found that the question of the power of the
Attorney General to require burdensome conditions attached to his
release on bond presented such a question.166 Justice Douglas
explained that “There is a constitutional question that lurks in every
bail case,” because “The Eighth Amendment provides that ‘exces-
sive bail’ shall not be required.”167 Justice Douglas, and several
other justices who dissented in Carlson, agree that the Eighth
Amendment prevents any person from being “capriciously held,”
regardless of whether they are held pursuant to a criminal or civil
proceeding.168 In Carlson, Justice Black, who would have found
bail mandatory, explicitly rejected “the contention that this consti-
tutional right to bail can be denied a man in jail by the simple device
of providing a ‘not criminal’ label for the techniques used to incar-
cerate.”169 Justice Black reasoned that “Imprisonment awaiting
determination of whether that imprisonment is justifiable has pre-
cisely the same evil consequences to an individual whatever legal-
istic liable is used to describe his plight.”170
Finally, application of the Eighth Amendment to deporta-
tion proceedings is not antithetical to Congress’s plenary power in
the area of immigration. Applying the Bail Clause in no way chal-
lenges the plenary authority of Congress to admit and deport non-
citizens, it would simply clarify the procedures required should
Congress choose to detain non-citizens during their removal pro-
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ceedings.  The exercise of Congress’s plenary power over immi-
gration “is, of course, subject to judicial intervention under the
‘paramount law of the Constitution.’”171 Requiring a bail hear-
ing, or even ordering an immigrant released on bail, does not chal-
lenge Congress’s ultimate power to deport him once a final order
is issued.  Review of the procedures used to implement the depor-
tation power does not require a court “to consider the political
branches’ authority to control entry into the United States.”172
Enforcement of the Eighth Amendment would not allow danger-
ous aliens or aliens who are a flight risk to escape detention; it
would simply require that the government prove that the detention
of each individual is warranted.  Congress must always choose “a
constitutionally permissible means of implementing” its deporta-
tion power,173 which includes refraining from detaining non-citi-
zens in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  
Further support for the interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment as prohibiting the arbitrary denial of bail can be found
in the practice of the states. The English history of the Eighth
Amendment may not be dispositive, due to ambiguity and the diffi-
culty of determining which provisions of English law the American
Founders meant to incorporate.  Even if the import of the Bail
Clause cannot be discerned by reference to its English history, the
practice of the states, both at the beginning of the republic and
since, indicate that the unreasonable denial of bail is inconsistent
with American jurisprudence. The Supreme Court, when consider-
ing the Eighth Amendment, has stated: “Time works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a
principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth. This is particularly true of constitu-
tions.”174 In Trop v. Dulles, though referring specifically to the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,175 the Supreme Court
acknowledged that “the words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not
precise, and their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”176 The word “excessive”, like
“cruel and unusual,” is a vague and relative term that can depend on
the standards of the community for its definition. Thus, because of
the difficulty in interpreting it, the Excessive Bail Clause could be
given meaning by reference to the evolving standards of decency.  
The evolving standards test is well established in the
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The Court has
noted that “legislative measures adopted by the people’s chosen
representatives weigh heavily in ascertaining contemporary stan-
dards of decency,”177 and has given meaning to the vague language
in the Eighth Amendment by reference to state legislative enact-
ments and state practice.178 State bail laws and practice are very
well developed, unambiguous and provide a solid basis on which to
rest an interpretation “excessive bail.”179 Only nine states do not
guarantee a general right to bail in their constitutions and merely
prohibit excessive bail.   By contrast, twenty states guarantee a right
to bail in all but capital cases,180 and twelve more provide a right
to bail except where the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt
is strong and the defendant has been determined to pose a danger to
the public.181 Nine more states specifically define violent or danger-
ous offenses that are not bailable, and most of these provide specif-
ic, swifter procedures when bail is denied.  
Thus, a total of thirty-two states guarantee a right to bail
except in capital cases or when the defendant is deemed dangerous.
In separate cases, the Supreme Court has found a national consen-
sus against executing the mentally retarded and then against juve-
niles where thirty states prohibited such executions; twelve states
had no death penalty at all, and only 18 specifically prohibited the
execution of these groups.183 Yet, in both cases, the Supreme Court
found that a national consensus had developed against the execution
of these two groups. Regarding bail, a majority of state constitu-
tions prohibit a blanket denial of bail absent a finding of dangerous-
ness or risk of flight.  Granted, the state standards are not so much
evolving as evolved, but the test has never been applied to the
Excessive Bail Clause. Thus, the pervasiveness of the prohibition
on the unjustified denial of bail, evident in the number of state pro-
visions barring such practices, indicates that the arbitrary denial of
bail has always violated the standards of decency of the United
States, and continues to do so. Thus, the Excessive Bail Clause
should be read to likewise prohibit the arbitrary and unreasonable
denial of bail. 
The Supreme Court’s inquiry into the evolving standards
of decency does not end with the test for a national consensus. The
Court also noted that “the Constitution contemplates that in the end
[a court’s] own judgment will be brought to bear on the question”
of the acceptability of a certain practice under the Eighth
Amendment. Thus, a court can exercise its own independent judg-
ment to recognize that it cannot be reasonable to deny bail indefi-
nitely to a large group of people with no procedural protections and
no individualized determinations of dangerousness or risk of flight.
To do so offends general principles of criminal jurisprudence as
well as the core purpose of the Bill of Rights to guard against gov-
ernment abuse of power. 
The Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment
should be read not only to forbid the setting of bail in excessive
amounts, but also to prohibit the unreasonable denial of bail.  Such
an interpretation is consistent with both the history of that Clause,
the purpose behind the enactment of the Bill of Rights generally and
the Eighth Amendment, specifically limitation of government
power.  Furthermore, this interpretation of the Eighth Amendment
is drawn from Supreme Court precedent and is also in line with the
contemporary standards of the United States, as reflected in the
laws and practices of the states.  
In order to ensure that a denial of bail is reasonable, a non-
arbitrary justification for the denial must be proved before someone
can be locked away to await further proceedings.  Such a showing
must be accompanied by basic procedures, such as a hearing, to
guarantee that a valid justification exists.  
The guarantees of the Bail Clause are not limited by text,
debate history or Supreme Court interpretation, to criminal cases
and thus this test should also be applied in the context of civil
removal proceedings. The Clause renders unconstitutional the
mandatory detention without a hearing of an entire class of aliens
required by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).  
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